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25 March 1952

SECOND DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON TRAINING

I. Introduction

Pursuant to the directive and terms of reference, dated 15 October 1951, (attachment A), the Working Group has considered its problem in accordance with the attached agenda (attachment B). Discussion and recommendations in this report will be referenced to the agenda.

II. General

1. The Working Group recognized at the beginning of its task that it was confronted with the following situations:

(a) A Professional Training Program, limited in scope, which was

a going operation, conducted by the Office of Training

by means of the specialized selection of exceptionally

qualified young men and women who are employed against

general agency alerts and shipped and assigned to consumer

offices after their basic training has been completed.

(b) A highly developed training program for the covert offices,

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an under-developed training program for the overt Offices, and almost no organized training for "administrative", or support components of CIA.

(c) Many of the Offices understaffed, with heavy responsibilities, urgent needs for personnel which resulted in immediate assignment to duty status of new employees, and relatively open, unobligated T/O's.

(d) Growing desire by the overt Offices for personnel to be trained in basic intelligence principles, partly as a result of the success of the Professional Training Program (See (a) above), and partly as a result of mature consideration by the executives of the overt Offices of the more specialized aspects of work in intelligence.

(e) The eventual long-range program that would be desirable for CIA to adopt with respect to selection and training of all junior Intelligence Officers occupying professional positions. Even during the course of its study, the relationship of these various factors has changed, as for example, the recent

policy with respect to personnel ceilings and T/O's.

2. The Working Group has considered these problems from an overall standpoint. It is apparent that approach, methods and procedures necessary to handle the several situations listed above differ at present and will continue to differ for some time until the Agency has acquired more experience and greater stability. For example, employees for immediate duty assignment in offices are procured mainly against specific T/O slots; in the overt offices these new employees generally go to work immediately in their designated units and receive only the CIA indoctrination course and on-the-job training conducted by the units in their offices. In the covert offices the majority of new employees are assigned immediately to lengthy training programs and do not reach their duty assignments for several months. In support components there is no recognizable pattern of training. Agency recruiting methods and personnel used for this type of personnel procurement differ from those used for the procurement of professional trainees in the present Professional Training Program. Security procedures are different, as are also assessment, evaluation, and assignment procedures.

3. Discussion in the Working Group also revealed the fact that there was an unrealistic approach to the problem of overt personnel in the covert offices. Accordingly, the Working Group presents its recommendations in two categories:

- (a) Trainees for overt use, ~~including overt~~ and semi-covert activities in both overt and covert offices.
- (b) Trainees for deep-cover activities in covert offices.

Procurement and training of trainees for deep-cover activities involve questions of security and operations that require special handling and are primarily the responsibility of the executive and operational elements of the covert offices. For this reason the Working Group has largely confined its deliberations and recommendations to recruiting, selecting, and training new employees for use in overt and semi-covert professional positions in overt and covert offices. The types of positions that have been considered are shown in Attachment "P", which is the list of job titles that have been classified as professional positions.

III. Discussion (See Agenda, Attachment B)

1. Criteria and Standards for Selection

(a) General selection criteria for professional trainees are stated in Attachment C. At present the main criteria are brains and capacity to become good intelligence officers with the matter of specialization and ultimate assignment a secondary matter.

(b) The patterns of staffing, T/O's and ceilings are too confused at present to accurately estimate the magnitude of the proper intake. However, several hundred professional trainees are needed per year to provide the required build-up and to compensate for attrition. In view of the present tendency to place a ceiling on Agency personnel a static situation may occur in the near future. Thereafter recruiting will be largely against normal advancement and attrition. It is believed a sound philosophy to fill top positions by promotion of experienced juniors within the Agency as far as possible, although it is recognised that it

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is advisable to bring in personnel from outside the Agency
to staff certain key positions and to provide fresh and
niture view point.

(c) One of the difficulties in building up the Agency has been
to staff the various components with personnel who have an
adequate basic knowledge of intelligence. In order to
assure adequate intelligence background, all incoming
personnel should go through the ^{initial} trainee program. When the
personnel situation becomes stabilized, the major intake of
new professional employees up through grade GS-11 should be
through the revised Professional Training Program.

2. Procurement of Trainees

- (a) Locating
- (b) Screening
- (c) Recruiting

These matters were considered together because of their interlocking
nature.

(1) The memorandum to the Chairman, Project Review Committee, from the Director of Training and Assistant Director (Personnel), dated 19 September 1951, (Attachment D), outlines the present method of procurement of trainees from universities. This method should be strengthened and amplified and thoroughly integrated with other phases of the procurement program.

In this connection, the memorandum to [REDACTED]

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from [REDACTED] dated 9 January 1952, concerning the recruitment of consultant contacts for the Professional


Training Program (Attachment E) was considered together 25X1A

with a report made to the Working Group by [REDACTED]

of his first contact experiences. It is probable that the majority of trainees will be procured from universities.

elsewhere
Those procured otherwise can be injected into the system when procured.

(2) Certain candidates will be unearthed who have qualifications for deep-cover activities. If they are recruited on an overt basis, their usefulness for deep cover is



(d) Security Clearing

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(1) IIS should be advised as soon as possible during the

screening process of names and basic data on candidates so

that preliminary clearance may be given for further dis-

cussions and so that a security investigation may proceed


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while further screening takes place (See Attachment C).

(2) It is considered particularly important that recruiters

or consultants should consult DC/C [REDACTED] before 25X1A

approaching any institutions or individuals in institutions.



(e) Assessing and testing.

(f) Evaluating.

(1) It was agreed generally that assessment tests, if

properly conducted, are of value in selecting trainees. Mr.

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[REDACTED] present his views verbally and in memorandum,

dated 14 February 1952, subject: "Recommendations for Selection of Professional Trainees" which the Working Group approved in principle. It was brought out, however, that analysis of candidates, both from assembly of the tests and personal interviews, depends largely on the individual assessor and may be influenced by his personality, particularly if the

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written report is used ~~old~~ in future reference.

(2) Certain facts uncovered in the security investigation may have an important bearing on test evaluations, since they may be unknown even to the candidate and unappreciated by the assessor. It is recognized that Security files cannot be made available to other than I&S personnel. It is felt the advice of I&S should be sought in evaluating assessment reports.

(3) It was concluded generally that:

a. As a check of the assessment evaluation, the candidate should be personally interviewed if possible by ~~a board~~ ^{2 panel} of review or examiners composed of representatives of the ~~covert and covert~~ Offices and of Personnel, Training and Security. This board should have authority to overrule ~~to all other evaluations~~ the assessment evaluation.

b. Criminal assessment evaluations should be validated by a record of performance in assessment files as far as it is practical to maintain such records.

3. Training (To follow)

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3.. Training

(a) Curricula:

(1) The Working Group discussed at some length the curricula of the Professional Trainee Program on the basis of the memorandum from the Chief, CIA Intelligence School, "Curricula for Intelligence School Students", dated 15 January 1952, (Attachment I). Schedule of Classes for the course to be given from 18 February to 24 May 1952 together with a bibliography of recommended reading (Attachment J) was also considered.

(2) The curriculum should be kept under review especially if the recommendation that all new personnel go through the Intelligence School is adopted. It is possible that the curriculum might be lengthened or augmented to cover specific interests of some of the Offices and it certainly should be coordinated with the curriculum of the basic training

(b) Assigning Trainees

The Working Group believes that the interests of the Agency are best served, both at present and in the long run, if new personnel are recruited only against slots in "consumer" Offices and units. The only exception to this policy should be the recruitment and temporary employment of draft eligible trainees for whom slots must be provided during the period of their preliminary CIA indoctrination and training prior to entering the Armed Services. The only question of assignment then comes in the matter of adjustment of mal-assignment discovered in the course of training and in the assignment of military trainees after their military duty has been completed. Trainees with specialized backgrounds may be of use to more than one Office. A scientist, for example, might be of use to O/SI, TSS, O/SO/TGS, OO/C [redacted] etc. An economist might be of use to O/RR, [redacted] area branches of O/SO or OO/C, or overseas assignments.

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where conflicts are found to occur, the Professional

Selection Panel should arbitrate and recommend assignment.

4. Magnitude of this Program and Appropriate Intake

- (a) Needs of the Agency
- (b) Turnover
- (c) Eventual Static Requirements

These matters are considered together because precise data or estimates are not available to the Working Group.

(1) An analysis of intelligence officer vacancies, GS-5

through GS-11 against approved T/O slots broken down by

Offices as of 25 January 1952 indicated 262 vacancies

(Attachment K).

(2) An analysis of separations of intelligence personnel

GS-5 through GS-11 for the four months - September-December

1951 - indicates a total of 71 for this period (Attachment K)

or approximately 284 per year, based on this sample.

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(3) While precise data in the form of approved T/O's, adjusted ceilings, and recruitment requests is not available, the Working Group is convinced that there should enter on duty each year through the revised Professional Selection and Training Program the following young career professionals, in the grades GS-5 through GS-11:

Approximately

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To compensate for attrition through separations of all kinds and advancement to higher category.

Approximately

To provide for an orderly build-up over and above present on duty strength.

Total per annum

5. Training Program Coordination

(a) Relation of trainee program as such to on-the-job training.

(1) When all new employees for professional positions go

through the CIA Intelligence School as an EOD requisite,

they should be adequately based in intelligence and the

background of our major potential enemies. Thereafter any

"on-the-job" training would be in the way of current

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refreshers probably immediately related to their work or specialty.

(2) Intelligence training of personnel already on the job presents another problem. Various proposals have been made and certain types of on-the-job training are being given. Although this problem is not within the purview of this Working Group, it is believed that it should be given careful consideration and steps taken to assure that all existing personnel have an adequate intelligence background foundation.

(b) Relationship to Covert Training

(1) It is particularly important that trainees for covert activities have a thorough basic intelligence training.

There would appear to be no reason why new employees in covert Offices should not go through the CIA Intelligence School along with candidates for overt Offices. Candidates for deep-cover activities should, as far as possible, have

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a similar training but administered and conducted separately.

It was the consensus of the Working Group, however, that

these candidates should not mix with overt trainees; in

fact, they probably should not be trained in Washington.

Furthermore, they will have to undergo special training

which will be given by the covert Offices. The extent to

which is practical to use the CIA Intelligence School

curricula or staff for training deep-cover candidates

Oy
should be determined between the covert Agencies and

Director of Training.

6. Security Measures

(b) Security Clearance and Briefing of Recruiters.

All recruiters and consultant-contacts must have full

security clearance and should be briefed thoroughly regarding

the early cut-off point for candidates for deep-cover activities.

*This section on the briefing, training and indoctrination of
consultant-contacts should be re-worked.*

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In order to protect the Agency, I&S should be given every possible backing both in way of funds and personnel to carry on special security activities in connection with the trainee program. Appropriate steps should be taken to brief both recruiters and consultant-contacts on this security aspect and particular care should be used in security check of consultant-contacts before they are selected and briefed.

IV. Chronology

The sequence of events in the Professional Selection and Training Program is as follows:

1. Statement by Offices and other components of their needs for new personnel to fill professional positions in the GS-5 through GS-11 category.
2. Location, contacting, and screening of candidates in universities and industries by the Personnel Office through consultant-contacts or

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by other recruitment techniques.

3. Pre-security check by I&SO.

4. Screening and shopping of candidates to Offices by the Personnel Office.

5. Obligation of slots by Offices.

6. Security investigation initiated by I&SO.

7. Testing of candidates periodically at selected locations in the field and continuously in Headquarters.

8. Assessment.

9. Security Clearance

10. Review and confirmation of selection by Professional Selection Panel.

Panel.

11. Notification to candidate by Personnel Office.

12. EOD

13. Entrance in CIA Intelligence School.

14. Review of Training record by Professional Selection Panel.

V. Recommendations (See ditto attached)

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E. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. With regard to trainees for overt activities, including overt personnel assigned to covert Offices:
 - a. All new personnel recruited to fill professional positions in the Agency be required to go through a training program in order to give them an adequate basic intelligence background. Rare exceptions may be made for individuals who have had previous high-level intelligence experience.
 - b. The present Professional Training Program in the CIA Intelligence School be reorientated and expanded as speedily as possible into a Professional Selection and Training Program to give all new professional personnel a broad yet intensive intelligence training. Specialized training, including language, area and operational training, will be handled in other parts of the training program.
 - c. The curriculum of the CIA Intelligence School, including recommended reading, be revised to cover subjects of particular interest to Offices and be coordinated with TRS to reduce duplication in the curricula.
 - d. A selection board to be known as the Professional Selection Panel be established under the direction of the CIA Career Service Board. It would consist of five voting members and three advisory members as follows:
 - (1) Two representatives from the overt Offices representing the fields of operations and of plans.
 - (2) Two representatives from the covert Offices representing the fields of operations and of plans.
 - (3) One representative from one of the Deputy Director's Offices; DD/P, DD/A and DD/I to be successively represented.

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(4) Three advisory representatives, one each from the Office of Personnel, the Inspection and Security Office and the Office of Training.

The Panel will review selection standards for and the qualifications of all candidates up to and including the grade GS-11 for overt and semi-covert professional positions in both the overt and covert Offices and will finally approve on behalf of the Agency the selection of all professional personnel in these categories. In case of an adverse finding against an applicant by the Panel, the appropriate Assistant Director may appeal to his Deputy Director, whose decision will be final. The Panel will also, when requested by an Assistant Director, arrange for testing and assessment of a prospective employee in the GS-12 - 15 category, review his qualifications, and make recommendations to the requesting office.

- e. Personnel requirements of Offices for professional positions be submitted to the Office of Personnel which will inform the Professional Selection Panel and the Office of Training of the estimated intake so that they may plan accordingly. All recruitment will be undertaken against authorized slots in consumer Offices, except that a small number of slots will be set aside for the temporary accommodation of draft-eligible candidates who are brought here for indoctrination before entering the Armed Services.
- f. The program to establish consultant-contacts in colleges and universities (Project Review Committee Project TRN/ADP-92-52 of 22 October 1951) to recruit undergraduate and graduate students be vigorously implemented and ultimately expanded. The responsibility for implementation and expansion of the program shall lie with the Professional Selection Panel.
- g. No subsidy be given to university students prior to their CIA employment. No specific substantive guidance be given by the consultant contacts to undergraduate students. In certain cases, consultant-contacts may suggest that selected graduate students specialize in practical subjects or foreign aspects of their fields which might be useful if they should enter the intelligence field.

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- h. Consultant-contacts be briefed regarding the relation between recruiting for overt use in both overt and 25X1A covert Offices and that for deep-cover activities.
- i. [Redacted]
- j. [Redacted]
- k. No organized publicity be given the trainee recruiting program and that publicity of any kind regarding any aspects of the Professional Selection and Training Program be discouraged.
- l. All candidates for professional positions in grades up to and including GS-11 be given a one-day battery of tests before final commitments for employment are made; this testing to be given after the applicant has been recommended by recruiters and after PHS and other forms have been reviewed by the Office of Personnel.
- m. The testing in l. above be carried out several times a year in leading colleges and universities by competent consultants (or by a field unit) and in Washington by a headquarters unit, both to be directed by the Testing and Evaluation Division of the Office of Training.
- n. All candidates for professional positions in grades up to and including GS-11 who pass the preliminary screening be put through assessment in Washington.
- o. Assessment results be subsequently validated by comparison of performance records in the Agency with the assessment results.
- p. The Career Service Committee take appropriate steps to have the existing assessment procedures within the Agency reviewed in order that these procedures may

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implement the policy that all candidates for professional positions through the grade GS-11 be assessed according to validated techniques.

2. With regard to trainees for deep-cover activities:

- a. Recruiting and training of deep-cover candidates be conducted by the covert Offices separately from the Professional Selection and Training Program.
- b. A focal point be established for coordinating deep-cover recruiting between the covert Offices.
- c. A focal point be established in the Office of Personnel to coordinate overt and semi-covert and deep-cover recruiting in the field in order to avoid confusion 25X1C and minimize security risk.
- e. Covert training be coordinated with the Professional Selection and Training Program in order to make maximum practicable use of training, curriculum and staff.

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